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MONETARY INSTRUMENTS AND THE CONTROL OF
LIQUIDITY IN THE PHILIPPINES:
FOCUS ON OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
Armida S. San Jose
Introduction
Monetary policy refers to actions .of the.. Central Bank (CB)
or monetary authorities which are (1): aimed at".helping achieve
macroeconomic goals, and (2) exercised by infiuenc_ng such financial
factors as the quantity of money and the level of interest rates.
Monetary policy shares the general goals of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion policy such as price stability, economic growth and balance of
payments equilibrium or exchange rate stability. In addition, mone-
tary policy has some more specialized goals such as interest rate
stability and a strengthening of the financial system.
In a monetary economy, an excess supply of liquidity opposed
by an excess demand for goods and services could result in rising
prices and/or a deterioration in the balance of payments. On the
other hand, an insufficient supply of money could hamper economic
growth and development. The task of monetary policy therefore is to
keep the supply of money growing at an appropriate rate to ensure
sufficient economic growth and to maintain internal and external
stability.
For the CB to achieve the goals of monetary policy, it must be
able to operate through variables which are directly under its control,
called instruments, since goals are not directly controllable. Thus,
monetary policy actions must be made by means of instruments.
Moreover, since a change in an instrument may not affect a variable
which is an ultimate goal of monetary policy, intermediate variables
which are referred to as intermediate targets are identified. These
intermediate targets serve as the channel through which monetary
instruments act on the economy in order to attain the desired goals.
Intermediate variables must be relatively controlled by the CB, and
their effects on the final objective should be reasonably predictable.
In the case of the Philippines, money supply is the intermediate
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target of monetary policy. Meanwhile, monetary policy instruments
include open market operations, the rediscount window, reserve
requirement, etc.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section I discussesthe
framework for analyzing how monetary instruments affect monetary
targets. Section II describes the various instruments available to the
Central Bank of the Philippines as well astheir advantages and dis-
advantages. The last section summarizes the factors and conditions
that are considered in the choice of instruments and why open
market operations are preferred over other instruments.
I. The Control of DomesticLiquidity
For purposesof this presentation, the supply of money is
defined as the currency in circulation or the currency held by the
nonbank public (C) plus deposit liabilities of commercial banks (D)
which include demand deposits(rid), savings(sd) and time deposits
(td), and deposit substitutes(ds). In the Philippines,this definition
of moneyiscalled M3 or domesticliquidity. Thus,
M3 = C+D
(1)
whereD = dd + sd + td + cls
Reservemoney (RM) comprisesC and reservesof commercial
banks (R) which include cash in banks' vault and reservebalances
or deposits of commercial banks with CB. In the Philippines,how-
ever, commercial banks' holdingsof certain reserveeligible govern-
ment securities (REGS) 1 are considered as reserves. Thus, base




BM TM C + R + REGS
or BM = RM + REGS (3)
The money multiplier (k) is defined as the ratio between M3
and RM. Thus, from equation (1)and (2)
k - C + D (4)
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The supply of liquidity can be expressed as the product of the
money multiplier and RM.
M3 = kRM (5)
Equation 5 showsthat the supply of liquidity isaffected by changes
in the stock of RM and in the money multiplier. Changes in RM and
the money multiplier are in turn effected through the useof mone-
tary policy instruments such as open market operations, reserve
requirement, rediscounting,etc. To clearly understandthe process
by which monetary instruments affect RM and k and eventually
M3, the composition of k and RM could be examined.
In the caseof k asgivenby equation 4, each component of k
may be divided by total deposits(D) on the assumptionthat these
componentsare proportional to total deposits.Thus:
C+D
k = O D (6)
C+R
D D
c+1 k - (7)
c+r
where c = currency todeposit ratio
r = requiredreserves againstdeposits
Meanwhile, RM as defined in equation 2 represents the
liabilities of the CB. However, CB controls its liabilities by con-
trolling its assets.When viewed from the assetside, RM may be de-
fined as the sum of its net foreign assets(NFA) and net domestic
assets(NDA). Net domestic assets,on the other hand, arecomposed
of net domestic credits to the public sector (NDC Pub.), net
domestic creditsto the privatesector(NDC Pri.) and net other items
(NO/). Thus;
RM = NFA + NDA (8)
RM = NFA +NDC + NDC + NO/
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Substituting equations (7) and (9) in equation (5) gives
c+1 (NFA + NDC + NOC + NOI) (10) M3 -- pub pri c+r
The right-hand side of equation 10 shows the determinants of M3.
From this equation, it can be seenthat a reduction in r which would
cause k to increase would result in an increase in supply of banks'
reserves available for lending and ultimately in an increase in the
supply of M3. Monetary policy instruments can also affect M3
through changes in RM. For instance, when CB grants loans to banks
(say in the for,m of rediscount credits), CB's NDC increases,and is
pri
accompanied by an increasein reservebalancesof banks. The in-
crease in reservebalances of banks in turn would enable banks to
increase lendingsand thus generatedepositsor liquidity equal to k
timesthe initial increasein reserves.
While equation (10) showsthat the supply of M3 can be in-
fluenced by CB actionsthrough the use of monetary instruments,it
is also affected by factors which are not exactly within the control
of CB. Insofarascomponents of CB's assetsare concerned,NFA is
directly related to the balance of payments (BOP) position of the
country. And since the BOP is affected by external factors such as
economic growth in major trading partners, foreign inflation rate,
import and export prices, etc., NFA may be said to be not directly
controllable. However, in the case of the Philippines, the BOP is
one of the major objectives that get translated into a target for CB's
NFA. In this case,the desired level of CB's NFA which is consistent
with the BOP objective is determined and becomesa target variable.
Meanwhile, CB's credit to the public sector may also bedifficult
to control, unless ceilings are imposed. In most lessdeveloped coun-
tries (LDCs), this variable is correspondingly adjusted to the govern-
ment's budgetary requirement. In casesof a Philippine government
stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (the
Fund), a ceiling on CB credit to the public sector is imposed to in-
still fiscal discipline and to enhance the attainment of monetary
goals. Moreover, the Philippine CB Charter also provides a statutory
limit on the amount of borrowings that the National Government
can obtain from CB for any given year which isequivalent to 20 per-
cent of the National Government's average earnings (or revenues)
for the past three years. Hence, to a certain extent, CB credit to the
public sector can be predicted if not controlled. The major deter-
minant of M3 as shown in equation 10 that can bedirectly controlled
by CB is its credits to the private sector (or banks) which are in turn
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Of the components of k, the currency ratio is determined by
the general public's preference to hold either cash or deposits.
While this decision to a certain extent may be influenced by CB
through interest rates, e.g., higher interest rates may induce the
public to minimize cash holdings and keep larger amounts of depo-
sits,it is alsoaffected by other uncontrollable factors, in the Philip_
pines, the currency ratio was found to be largely affected by non-
economic factors suchas uncertaintiesover political and peace and
order conditions. The controllable component of k, therefore, isr
since it is the CB that determines and hasauthority to changethe
reserveratio.
Operationally, monetary control may be imprecisein that it is
difficult for CB to maintain M3 at precisely the level it considers
appropriate and desirablebecauseof changesin the noncontrollable
factors whose impact on M3 is not entirely predictable. The degree
of precision of CB's control over M3 dependson how well it can
predict not only movements in the uncontrollable factors but also
their impact on monetary aggregates and, consequently,on the final
objectives. If the uncontrollable factors do not behaveasexpected,
changesor adjustmentsare madethrough policy instrumentsto off-
set the impact of suchfactorson the intermediate target M3 and on
the final objectives.
I1. Instrumentsof Monetary Policy
in the Philippines
Monetary policy instruments in the Philippines may be classi-
fied into three types: (1) those that are usedasmarket intervention
controls in the financial markets to influence the availability and
rate of return on assetssuch as open market operations and redis-
counting; (2) those that placerestrictionson the portfolios or opera-
tions of banks suchas reserverequirement and direct controls; and
(c) others that do not strictly fall into the first two types suchas
National Government (NG) depositswith CB from proceedsof T-
bills sales, prior import deposits and moral suasion. These instru-
mentsof monetary policy arediscussedbelow.
A. Market Intervention
Open market operations
In the Philippines, open market operations consist of the
following instruments:
Repurchase Agreements (RPs)- Thesearetransactionswherein
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to sell them after a specified period for a certain consideratione.g.,
interest rate. RPs are undertaken only when the desiredeffects on
the level of reservemoney are temporary. This is becauseRPshave
short-term durations. In effect, RPsare interest-bearingloansgiven
by the CB to banks on the basisof governmentsecuritiesas colla-
teral. RPsmay be categorized into two kinds: regularand overnight.
Regular RPsare undertakingswhere the CB buys government
securities from these dealerswith a commitment to sell back the
same securities at a stipulated interest rate and after a specified
period. Regular RPsare undertaken by CB for a period not exceed-
ing 15 days. The interest rate charged by CB is market-oriented,
taking into account the prevailing interest rates for T-bills and
interbank rates,among others. The governmentsecuritieswhich may
be usedare those (a) issuedby the NG or its instruments;(b) uncon-
ditionally guaranteed by the NG; and (c) maturing within a period
not exceeding 10 years. At present, CB loansunder this facility are
only given to governmentsecuritiesdealersfor inventory financing.
Overnight RPs,asthe name indicates,are loansof CBto banks
on an overnight basis which are used to assistbanks in meeting
reservedeficiencies which may result from clearing lossesand/or
heavier fund outflows during the preceding banking day. The rate
chargedby CB is basedon the interbank rate plusa certain penalty
rate to encourage banks to tap other sourcesof financing before
resortingto CB borrowings.
Reverse RPs (RRPs) - These are transactions whereby CB
borrowsfunds from banks usingits holdingsor inventory of govern-
ment securities in its portfolio as collateral with an agreement to
repay the loan (and hence buy back the securities) at a specified rate
and period of time. The rate at which CB borrows through this
facility is based on the prevailing market rate and other considera-
tions such as the yields on T_bills, the inflation rate and the peso-
dollar exchange rate, among others.
Not unlike RPs, RRPs are of two kinds: term and overnight.
Term RRPs usually cover a period of 7 to 14 days while overnight
RRPs are just borrowings by the CB for one day. Overnight RRPs
are at times used by CB to complement its borrowing under the
term RRP. Considering that banks do not normally lend all their
funds on a term basissince their short-term fund requirements may
not warrant such an action, CB borrows these funds on overnight
basis.
Outright Contracts - These transactions which involve the out-
right purchase or sale of government securities are always carried
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able securities are the subject of outright contracts. These govern-
ment securities, which are traded at discountsand quoted on ayield-
to-maturity basis,include T-bills, T-notesand other marketablesecu-
rities issuedby government corporations and financial institutions.
At present, purchasesof marketable securitiesare done only in the
secondary market since the CB, as fiscal agent of the NG, is not
allowed under its Charter to participate in the primary market,
i.e., the Auction. It may be noted that at present CB rarely engages
in outright contracts since the market situation doesnot permit it
to undertakethis type of transaction.
CB Certificates of Indebtedness (CBCIs) - The CB may also
issueits own securitiesasit hasdone in the pastalthough the present
policy isto phaseout thesesecurities.CBCIs were first issuedduring
the 1970s to mop up excess liquidity arisingfrom the commodity
boom and to reallocate credit from urban to rural areasin support
of the country's intensified agricultural program. The features of
CBCIs were redesignedthrough the years to improve their market-
ability but these changesdid not prove to be attractive enough to
investors.
Meanwhile, CB Bills were introduced in March 1984 as an
instrument to mop up excessliquidity arisingfrom the nonpayment
of maturing foreign loansdue to the debt moratorium. Thesesecuri-
ties havematurities not exceedingone year and aresoldat a discount
and on a negotiatedbasis.The rates on thesesecuritiesare market-
determined; as such,they are not eligible asreservecover. CB Bills
proved to be effective in attaining their objective but were phased
out beginningin October 1986 to giveway to the auction of T-bills.
Prior to this period, CB Bills competed with T-bills, resultingin
increases in interestrates.
Basedon the foregoingdescription of the open market instru-
ments, the use of these instrumentsto attain target levelsof RM
and M3 may be inferred. RPsare utilized when the CB desiresto
increasethe level of RM. On the other hand,when there isa needto
reduce the level of RM, RRPs and the issuanceof CB securities
may be undertaken. It may be noted that for the useof theseinstru-
mentsto be effective it hasto be done hand in handwith interestrate
policy. For example, duringperiodswhen a contractionary monetary
policy is called for, RRPs should be priced in suchaway that banks
are induced to lend to CB. Hence,through the useof open market
instruments,the CB may influence not only liquidity levelsbut also
interestrates.
The flexibility of open market operationsisan advantageof this
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quent intervals so that reservesof the banking system can beadjusted
on a virtually continuous basis. Finally, open market operations
occur at the initiative of the CB, thereby permitting it to determine
the precisevolume of the transactions.
This instrument, however, has limitations. For instance, RPs
and RRPs have very short maturities such that the desired effects
of these transactions are automatically reversed upon maturity.
Given a program of sustained credit restraint, the CB resorts to con-
tinuous rollovers of the instruments. Such an approach may be costly
to the CB and injects an element of uncertainty in terms of meeting
the objectives of open market operations. The size of the CB's and
the banking system's holding of securities that are eligible for RPs
and RRPs also put transactional limits to the use of open market
operations. Moreover, the present array of securities has not been
useful for outright contracts because of the securities' unattractive
yields. The market for these securities hasremained thin, with banks
acquiring the securities primarily for the "sweeteners" attached to
them such as reserveeligibility and collateral value features. Hence,
the effective use of open market operations for liquidity manage-
ment and control would require a fairly developed financial system
where there is ample supply of marketable government securities and
where the market for these securities is strong.
Rediscounting
This is a transaction whereby CB purchasesa bank's assetsat a
discount. This instrument, as used in most LDCs, plays a dual role -
one as a tool to allocate credits to preferred sectors of the economy
and another to influence the supply of money and credit. When
rediscounting is employed, its effect becomessimilar to open market
operations. Rediscounting affects the reservesof banks and therefore
their ability to extend credits. When the prevailing economic condi-
tions call for a reduction in M3, CB may limit or reduce credits
extended under this facility. Conversely, when the desired monetary
stance is expansionary, the CB may increase the volume of redis-
count credits.
Rediscounting, as practised in the Philippines, is defined asthe
privilege extended to banks to borrow or secure loans and advances
from the CB against eligible papersof their borrowers. Ever since time
rediscounting was first used in the Philippines until the end of 1985,
it was utilized more as a facility for credit allocation. Preferred or
priority activities were afforded low rediscount rates to ensure an
attractive spread between the rediscount rate and the bank's relend-
ing rate so as to encourage fund flows to these priority activities.
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credits grew, but during periods of contractionary monetary policy,
the volumeof rediscountreleases wascontrolled. The low rediscount
rate causedbanks to rely heavily on "cheap" CB financing for their
credit operations, and this, to a certain extent, did not encourage
domesticdeposit mobilization.
In cognizanceof the weaknessesof this rediscounting policy
and the important role that this instrument could play in liquidity
management,the CB rationalized its rediscountfacility in November
1985. In particular,the rediscountrate wasmademarket-determined
to truly reflect the marginalcost of the funds of banks, ceilingson
bank relending rates were lifted in line with the deregulation of
interest rates,and the rediscountstructurewassimplifiedfrom about
16 windows representingdifferent priority areasto just two cate-
gories: agricultural production credits and general purpose credits.
The rediscount rate is being reviewed quarterly and adjusted if
warranted to keep it attuned to market conditions. More frequent
changes,while desirable,are felt to produceadministrative problems
and confusion in their implementation since mostof the rediscount-
able papers are agricultural production credits of banks which
farmers avail themselvesof in the rural areas, and therefore they
may not be in a position to keep abreastof frequent changesin the
rates. Hence, it may be said that the facility's allocative feature
dilutesits effectiveness asa liquidity managementtool.
The present rediscount policy continuesto bear some weak-
nesses.For one, the arrangement whereby the rediscount rate is
adjusted on a quarterly basisdoes not provide CB with sufficient
leewayto make it effective sincemarket rates may riseand fall below
the rediscount rate during a given quarter after the rediscount
rate has been announced. A rediscount rate that has previously
been restrictive can become expansionary if other interest rates
rise. To maintain an unchangeddiscount rate policy, the CB would
have to changethe discount rate frequently. Secondly,the CB redis-
count rate shouldalways bealignedwith other CB ratessuchasrates
on RPs and RRPs if CB'saction isto be consistentin pursuingthe
thrust of monetary policy. A rediscountratethat is lowerthan RRP
rates could induce banks to borrow under the rediscountfacility
and lend it back under the RRP window, thereby makinga profit
out of CB operations. A rediscountrate that isabove or below the
prevailing RP rate may giveconfusingsignalsto the market regard-
ing the stance of monetary policy. In the Philippines at present,
it appears that it is the psychological impact of rediscount rate
changesthat tends to make it effective as a liquidity instrument.
Quarterly changesin the rediscount rate are viewed by the banking142 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
system as signalling a general interest rate movement which the
CB desiresto bringabout.
Ideally, the rediscountingfacility should be usedto support
and strengthen open market operations. For instance,when the CB
wishesto complement a restrictive monetary policy, say, during a
period of inflation, it usesitsopen market operationsto clampdown
on the supply of reserves in relationto a risingdemandfor credit.As
a result, interestrates rise,and banks, finding their reserveposition
under pressure,tend to increasetheir borrowing from CB. In order
to discouragethe creation of additional reservesthrough borrowing,




Reserverequirement is traditionally employed asa protection
to depositorsby ensuringliquidity or solvencyand, thus, the capa-
bility of the banking systemto meet the withdrawals of depositors.
In recent years, however, it hasincreasinglybeenrecognizedas
an important tool of monetary policy. The importance of reserve
requirement for liquidity/credit control stemsfrom the fact that this
variable is a very important determinant of the power of the bank-
ing system to expand credit and liquidity (on the basisof givenin-
creasesor decreases in reserveratios).
Thus, reserverequirement may be saidto play a dual role in the
financial systemas (a) a safeguardto depositors,and (b) a liquidity/
credit managementtool. The frequency with which changes are made
is generally related to the purposefor which reserverequirements
have been intended. For instance,when reserverequirement is used
as a solvency ratio designed to ensure the maintenance of sound
banking practices and adequate protection for depositors, legal
reservesarenot changedvery often. On the other hand,when usedas
a monetarypolicy tool, reserveratiosaresubjectto frequent changes.
As a monetary policy instrument, reserverequirement issubject
to important limitations. Changesin this instrument are lessflexible
than open market operations. Evena small percentagechangein the
reserve ratio could result in a relatively substantialadjustment in
banks' credit operations. The Central Bank should not resort to
changing reserve requirements if such change is expected to be
reversedsoon. Thus, asan instrument of monetary policy the reserve
requirement must be usedcautiously sinceeven a small changein it
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reserveratios may havedifferential effects on individual banksasit is
likely that bankshavevaryinglevelsof liquidity, This isan important
consideration in the use of this instrument particularly when the
financial system iscomposedof very big and very small banksas in
the caseof the Philippines. For instance,even if on aggregatethe
banking system showssubstantialexcessreserves,it is possiblethat
liquidity is concentrated only in a few big banks and that many
other banks are already deficient in their reserves. In this case,
further increasesin the reserve requirement could lead to bank
failuresand could havea destabilizingeffect on the economy.
Direct controls
Direct controls involve quantitative aswell asqualitative limits
on the freedom of banks to undertake certain activities. The most
common types of direct controls include limitations on aggregate
bank lending, selective limitations on certain types of bank lending,
and interest rate regulations. They are utilized whenever the Central
Bank feels that market intervention instruments do not achieve the
desired results.
At present, the Central Bank of the Philippines is pursuing
market orientation and deregulation in its policies such that direct
controls are no longer actively used. Interest rate controls were aban-
doned in 1983 when the last of the interest rate ceilings on loans and
deposits of banks was lifted. The only remaining direct control at
present is the requirement for banks to set asidea certain portion (25
percent) of their Ioanable funds for agricultural and agrarian reform
credits. This requirement, however, is not a direct CB regulation but
is in compliance with a presidential decree. Recently, the CB
supported moves to abolish or amend this requirement since it was
found to have raised the intermediation cost of banks and to have
failed in its objective of increasing fund flows to the agricultural
sector.
C. Other Instruments
1. Prior Import Deposits - This takes the form of a require-
ment that importers must maintain deposits with the Central Bank
or some other bank for a specified period of time as part of the
funds needed for import payment. This measure tends to lock in
funds for import payments aswell as raise the cost of importation.
In the Philippines, this instrument is not being employed by the Cen-
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importers, it is a requirement of the Bankers Association of the
Philippines,and not of the CB.
2, Moral Suasion - This isan intangible yet important instru-
ment of monetary policy that is normally employed by the Central .
Bank whenever it is felt that market mechanismscould not take
fully the public interest into account. It isdefined asthe influence
that the Central Bank exercises to induce or convince banks to
conduct operations in a manner that would contribute to the attain-
ment of monetary goalsbut which may not be supportive of, and even
contradict, profit maximization objectives of banks in the short run.
It may take the form of a request for voluntary restraint on overall
lending or a suggestedpriority in lending to different sectors of the
economy. In most countries including the Philippines, this instru-
ment is utilized by the Central Bank from time to time although its
effectiveness may, to a certain extent, depend on the relationship of
the Governor as headof the Central Bank with the banks.
3. Government Deposits with Central Banks - This instrument,
as used in the Philippines, may be unique to this country but has
thus far been effective in meeting monetary targets and objectives.
This instrument involves an arrangement between the CB and the
national government whereby the latter floats Treasury Securities
(largely T-bills) in amounts over and above its usual requirement for
financing its deficit. Proceeds from the sale of the "excess" T-bills
are placed in a fixed-term deposit account with the CB for which the
CB pays market interest rates (equivalent to T-bills rate for the same
maturity). This arrangement, which has a neutral effect on the
government's budget deficit and which has the same effect as the
issuance by CB of its own instruments, was originally intended to
allow the government to offset the expansionary effect on RM and
M3 of the phaseout of CB Bills in favor of T-bills beginning in Octo-
ber 1986. Since then, the arrangement has actively been relied upon
to meet monetary targets.
From the standpoint of monetary management, this instrument
limits CB's flexibility in controlling monetary aggregates.The CB's
ability to meet monetary targets is made largely dependent on
fiscal policies and decisions. For one, the volume of the weekly sale
of T-bills in the auction market, as well as the acceptable bid rates,
is decided by fiscal authorities. Secondly, the government's com-
pliance with the desired and agreed upon level of its deposit that
would be maintained with the CB hinges on the government's ability
to live within its targeted budget deficit. In caseswhere there are
shortfalls in government revenue collections and increases in expen-
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ment to withdraw thesedepositsfor budget deficit financing. When
this happens, monetary management is jeopardized. Clearly, the
effective implementation of this instrument hinges on a close coor-
dination of monetary and fiscal policies.
Under the T-bill auction program, the weekly volume of flota-
tion is announced to government securities dealers way ahead of
time. Hence, any unanticipated changes in uncontrollable factors
in the RM accounts would be difficult to offset through this arrange-
ment since the volume of flotation for a given period of time shall
have already been set and may no longer be changed. Moreover,
this arrangement presents problems to CB in terms of offsetting very
temporary or short-term swings in RM levels in-between auction
dates. At present, such temporary fluctuations are being addressed
through the use of RRPs and RPs but these operations are said to
adversely affect auction rates. Notwithstanding the foregoing limita-
tions, this arrangement has made the present conduct of open mar-
ket operations in the Philippines more orderly since only Treasury
issues (mainly T-bills) are being sold through auction unlike pre-
viously when both Treasury and CB securities with similar market
features were simultaneously sold on a negotiated basis.
II1. The Choiceof Instruments
The choice of policy instrumentsin implementing a monetary
policy action to achieve a target for a given period would depend
on a numberof factors which include:
a) the state of development and structure of the financial system
(i.e., whether thre is a strong government securitiesmarket) and
the strength and size of individual bankscomprisingthe systems;
b) the natureand magnitudeof the policy action; and
c) the promptnessof the responseof and degreeof impact on the
monetaryaggregate.
From the discussionof the advantagesand disadvantagesof
each policy instrument in the previoussectionand consideringthe
abovementioned factors, it appearsthat (a) open market operations
have a distinct advantageoverthe other instrumentsbecauseof their
flexibility in the complexeconomicworld, (b) data tend to lagbehind
eventsand are at times insufficient to fully discloseemergingcondi-
tions/developments in the financial system. Becauseof this, adapta-
tions or changesin policiestend to be undertaken in a gradualor
step-by-stepmannerso that they canbe readily modified or reversed
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polio/makers. Open market operationsarethe bestinstrumentsuited
to the step-by_stepadaptation of monetary policy sincethey canbe
usedto initiate small policy actionsor to aggressively carry out large
changesin reservesover relatively shorter periodsof time. They are
continuous in nature, can be undertaken quickly and are subjectto
ready modification and reversal.Open market operations can there-
fore take the lead in general monetary policy implementation,
with changesin other instrumentsonly to supplementand reinforce
the initiative.
Reserverequirement as a tool can be inflexible sinceit could
not be changedasfrequently asopen market operations. The effect
of frequent changesin the reserveratio may be adverseparticularly
when the structure of the financial systemis suchthat there islarge
variation in levelsof liquidity among banks. For example, frequent
increasesin the reserverequirement may pushsmalland weak banks
to the brink of collapseasthesebanksmay find it difficult to adjust
to thesechanges.Moreover, a highreserverequirement divertsa signi-
ficant portion of bank funds to low or nonyielding assetsand
increasesthe cost of intermediation which tends to discouragethe
development of the bankingsystem. Hence, this instrument may be
used if it is felt that the needto provide or absorbreservesis long-
lastingor would prevail for a longperiod of time.
Similarly, rediscounting may not also be asflexible asopen
market operations. Once a rediscountrate isannounced, it must be
kept for some time before revisingit. The effect on the monetary
target may be impreciseand not immediatesincethere could stillbe
a significant demandfor rediscountingloansdespite upward adjust-
mentsin the rate, unlessquantitative limits or quotasareset.
While the foregoingshowsthe relativeadvantagesof open mar-
ket operations vis-a-visother instruments, it cannot be concluded
that it is by itself sufficient to attain the targets and goalsof mone-
tary policy. What is important in the implementation of any mone-
tary policy action is consistencyand harmonization in the useof
variousinstrumentsavailableto the CB.